Abstract-This paper uses a rich employer-employee matched data set to investigate the existence and the extent of nonprofit and part-time wage and compensation differentials in child care. The empirical strategy adjusts for workers' self-selection into the for-profit or the nonprofit sector and into full-time or part-time work, as well as for unobserved worker heterogeneity, using a discrete factor model. We find differences between the regimes (full-time for-profit, full-time nonprofit, part-time for-profit, part-time nonprofit) in the manner in which human capital characteristics of the workers are rewarded. There is substantial variation in wages as a function of employee characteristics, and there is variation in wages within sectors. The results indicate that part-time jobs are good jobs in center-based child care, and there exist nonprofit wage and compensation premia, which support the property-rights hypothesis.
I. Introduction
T he nonprofit sector constitutes a significant and expanding segment of the U.S. economy. The number of private nonprofit organizations increased by almost 19% between 1989 and 1997, from 1,262,000 to 1,498,000 (Urban Institute, 2000) . The number of national nonprofit associations increased by 56% between 1980 and 1997, reaching almost 23,000 in 1997 (U.S. Census Bureau, 2000) . Employment in the nonprofit sector increased from 7.1 million full-time equivalent (FTE) paid workers in 1990 to 9.6 million in 1995; and in 1995 nonprofit employment accounted for 8.8% of the GDP in the U.S. (Salamon et al., 1999) . There are theoretical reasons to believe that the economic behavior of nonprofit enterprises may be different from their for-profit counterparts (Lakdawalla and Philipson, 1998; Rose-Ackerman, 1996; Hansmann, 1980) . One such difference pertains to wage-setting behavior. Nonprofit enterprises are expected to create rents for their workers, which would translate into wage markups. Alternatively, if nonprofit workers differ from for-profit workers in their altruism, this may translate into a nonprofit labor donation and lower nonprofit wages (Preston, 1989) . The empirical evidence on nonprofit wage differentials is ambiguous. As explained in Section II below, the literature is far from having reached a consensus on the issue.
Around 17% of all workers and around one-quarter of all female workers work part time (Bureau of Labor Statistics, 2000) . The fact that average wages of part-time workers are less than those of full-time workers with similar characteristics raises the question of whether part-time jobs are bad jobs (Blank, 1990) . 1 The substantial size of part-time employment makes this an important, and as yet unresolved, question.
Using an extraordinarily detailed employer-employee matched data set, this paper addresses two questions: Are wages and compensation of workers who work in the nonprofit sector lower than their counterparts in the forprofit sector; and are part-time jobs bad jobs? We find that both answers are no for child care workers. We document substantial nonprofit premia in wages and compensation. Similarly, we find that part-time jobs are good jobs. These results are not likely due to some idiosyncratic characteristic of the child care industry. As we demonstrate in the paper, the raw full-time and nonprofit differentials observed in our data show similar patterns to those in a number of industries using the 1990 Census data.
Section II gives the background, and puts the contribution of this paper into perspective. Section III presents the model, section IV describes the data, and section V presents the results. Section VI includes the sensitivity analysis, and section VII is the conclusion.
II. Background
As summarized by Preston (1988) , the theory of property rights predicts that nonprofit institutions may generate rents for their workers. This is partly because there is no owner to which the nonprofit manager is held accountable, which lessens the incentive for managers of nonprofit organizations to operate efficiently. As a result, there is reason to expect that nonprofit enterprises pay higher wages to comparable workers than their for-profit counterparts. On the other hand, it can be argued that nonprofit workers may have preferences that are different from for-profit workers. More precisely, some workers may be willing to work at nonprofit institutions at a lower wage and/or compensation than they could have obtained elsewhere. This labor donation may take place if nonprofit workers care about the social value of the good or service they produce more than for-profit workers (Preston, 1989) .
However, the empirical evidence on the nonprofit wage differential is ambiguous. Most of this ambiguity seems to stem from inadequate data sets employed to address the question. The investigation of nonprofit wage differentials takes two general forms. The first one is the analysis of firm-level data, such as given by Preston (1988) , who found that in the competitive segment of the day care industry, there is no significant difference in firm-level salaries between nonprofit and for-profit firms, whereas there is a 5%-10% nonprofit differential in the governmentsubsidized segment of the industry. Mocan and Viola (1997) investigated the determinants of wages and compensation in 398 child care centers. They found a positive nonprofit premium, which became statistically insignificant once sector breakdowns (for example, into religious centers and publicly funded centers) are controlled for.
A more refined investigation is done with micro data, where the determinants of worker wages are analyzed as a function of, among other factors, nonprofit status. Some analysts estimated wage regressions by including a dummy variable to indicate sector affiliation of the worker (for example, Shackett and Trapani, 1987; Borjas, Frech, and Ginsburg, 1983) . The findings of these studies may be unreliable because of the potential endogeneity of the sector dummy. As argued above, it is conceivable that workers who choose to work in the nonprofit sector may be systematically different from workers who work in the for-profit sector. If unobservable worker characteristics which influence sector choice also effect workers' wages, one will obtain biased estimates of the sector impact. For example, Weisbrod (1983) estimated separate earnings functions for lawyers employed in public-sector firms and those employed in private firms. He reported that public-sector lawyers received lower wages than private-sector lawyers. Using the same data set and controlling for self-selection into sectors, Goddeeris (1988) found no evidence that publicsector lawyers accepted earning sacrifices, underlining the importance of selection bias.
There are only a few papers that address self-selection of workers into sectors. Holtmann and Idson (1993) and Preston (1989) used the two-stage approach developed by Lee (1978) and Heckman (1979) . Ruhm and Borkoski (2000) exploited the panel component of the Current Population Survey outgoing rotation groups to control for selfselection.
For the most part, recent research on part-time wage differentials has paid attention to nonrandom selection into part-time work (Hotchkiss, 1991; Blank, 1990; Simpson, 1986) . However, most of the work in this literature faced challenges pertaining to measurement error in key variables (such as wages and hours) and a failure to control for nonwage benefits and other job attributes. As explained by Montgomery and Cosgrove (1995) , the data sets employed in these studies did not allow for detailed controls for firm effects, or even occupation effects. Whereas most papers reported a negative part-time wage differential (Montgomery and Cosgrove, 1995; Simpson, 1986) , Blank (1990) found a wage differential in favor of part-time workers. This paper brings together these two strands of literature: the wage-setting practices of nonprofit enterprises, and the investigation of relative wages of part-time workers in comparison with their full-time counterparts. The employer-employee matched data set used in the analysis not only includes very detailed characteristics of workers and firms, it also allows for measurement of variables with more precision than before. For example, most studies that used national data sets had to impute worker wages using annual wage or salary income and annual hours (Leete, 2001; Main and Reilly, 1992; Blank, 1990) . They were also forced to impute certain human capital measures of the workers, such as experience. Similarly, data obtained from workers are likely to contain substantial error regarding the nonprofit status of the establishment they are working for (Leete, 2001; Ruhm and Borkoski, 2000) . By contrast, in our data set the information pertaining to the firm is obtained from child care centers' directors and from their financial statements. All worker information, such as workers' experience in the field, experience outside the field, and tenure on the job, is obtained by surveying the workers directly.
Using the information on the types and dollar amounts of nonwage benefits offered by the centers, and the information on the type of staff which receives these benefits, we are able to calculate hourly compensation, and conduct the analysis for compensation as well. We allow for endogenous selection into sectors (nonprofit versus for-profit) as well as hours (part-time versus full-time). Controlling for unobserved individual heterogeneity, the model is estimated for both wages and compensation using full-information maximum likelihood.
III. Empirical Implementation
The model includes two selection equations and four sectoral wage equations. One selection equation allocates child care workers to the for-profit or the nonprofit sector; the other one allocates them to either full-time or part-time work. The cross-classification of these two selection rules partitions workers into four mutually exclusive categories. 2 The selection between the for-profit and nonprofit sectors and between full-time and part-time work can be summarized by the following equations:
where i represents workers. PR* stands for unobserved sentiment that determines the attachment to the for-profit sector, and FT* stands for the unobserved tendency to choose full-time work. Thus, PR ϭ 1 (the worker chooses the for-profit sector) if PR* Ͼ 0, and PR ϭ 0 otherwise. Similarly, if FT* Ͼ 0, then the worker chooses full-time work and the dichotomous variable FT takes the value 1, and FT ϭ 0 otherwise. The vectors X and Y are variables that determine the propensity to work in the for-profit sector and to work full-time, respectively. We specify linear sectoral wage equations as follows.
where the superscript ft stands for full-time, pt for parttime, np for nonprofit, and pr for for-profit. W i stands for the wage rate of the ith worker. The vector Z contains variables determining the wages in the nonprofit sector, and K is the vector of variables that determines wages in the for-profit sector. Although the model is identified through nonlinearities, to further facilitate identification the variables that represent family background such as household income, marital status of the worker, and the number of children are included in the selection equations, but they are omitted from the wage equations. To the extent that the latent variables that measure the propensity to work full time and the propensity to work in the for-profit sector are influenced by potential wages in these sectors, the variables that are included in Z and K should be included in X and Y. However, variables that are affiliated exclusively with one sector (such as union status) are not included in the selection equations.
It is plausible to think that the error term of the sector selection equation may be correlated with the error term of the full-time selection equation. That is, workers' unobserved preferences for sector choice may affect their choice of full-time versus part-time work. These disturbances may also be correlated with the disturbances of the wage equations: unobserved worker characteristics which influence sector and full-time choice decisions may affect wages.
To account for this potential correlation in the errors of the equations, we model the error structure as
where u i pr , . . . , u i pt-pr are mutually independent disturbances with mean zero, and the v's are the common factors that affect the error terms ⑀. The factor loadings ('s) allow for the effects of the common factors to vary across equations. The u's and v's are independent of the explanatory variables. The v's are unobserved variables that generate worker heterogeneity. We allow for two such factors to take account of the correlations among equations. For example, one factor might represent unobserved motivation, and the other one tastes for work.
In principle, one can estimate this system by imposing a parametric joint distribution for the two sources of unobserved heterogeneity and integrating out over its distribution. The drawback to this approach is that it requires computing multidimensional integrals, which is not feasible with traditional methods. Furthermore, it requires strong assumptions about the exact distribution of the heterogeneity. In related contexts, it has been shown that the results can be sensitive to departures from multinormality (Goldberger, 1983; Arabmazar and Schmidt, 1982) .
In this paper we use the discrete factor method (DFM), which, unlike standard selection corrections, estimates a semiparametric distribution to approximate the distribution among the error terms of the selection and wage equations. In this approach, the distribution of the v's is approximated with a step function and integrated out through a weighted sum of probabilities (Heckman and Singer, 1984) . Following Mroz (1999) , we assume that v is governed by a discrete distribution
where k are the points of support of the distribution, and k are the probability weights. The k 's, k 's, and 's are parameters to be estimated. K is specified a priori, and the six equations are estimated jointly with full-information maximum likelihood. 3 Mroz (1999) demonstrates that when the true correlation of the error terms is multinormal, DFM performs well in comparison with estimators which assume multinormality; and DFM performs better than normalitybased estimators when the underlying distribution is nonnormal. [See Blau and Hagy (1998) , Hu (1999) , and Mocan, Tekin, and Zax (2000) for applications of the discrete factor model.]
IV. The Data
We use a data set obtained from child care centers in California, Colorado, Connecticut, and North Carolina. 4 The data are based upon a stratified random sample of 398 day care centers (approximately 100 centers from each participating state), with equal representation of for-profit and nonprofit programs, providing full-time year-round care. They were obtained by actual visits to the centers during the spring of 1993. Data collectors gathered in-depth financial information on center costs and revenues; various nonwage benefits offered to teachers, aides, and part-time staff; ownership and union status, and a host of other center characteristics through on-site interviews and reviews of center records with center administrators or owners. In each of the 398 centers in the data set, two classrooms were randomly selected. Teaching staff in these classrooms were asked to complete a survey regarding their human capital characteristics, pretax hourly wages, weekly hours of work, family characteristics, and attitudes towards work in the child care industry. As a result, the extraordinary detail of the data allows for control of the job environment, as well as worker and firm characteristics, with precision.
Each center provided information about the total dollar value of their nonwage benefits. Each centers also provided detailed information about eleven different benefits provided for three worker categories (teacher, assistant teacher, and part-timer) that involve monetary costs to the center. For example, centers indicated whether fully paid or partially paid health insurance is provided for teachers, assistant teachers, and part-timers as a benefit. Other examples are at least partially paid dental insurance, paid vacations, paid maternity leave, paid health insurance for dependents, and paid sick or personal leave. For each center the total number of benefits provided for each worker category is counted. Because the job title and hours of work for each worker is known, the annual number of hours worked by full-time teachers, annual hours of full-time aides, and annual part-time hours can be calculated. Using this information, and center's total spending on benefits, as well as information on the proportion of line-item benefits provided to each worker group, the monetary value of hourly benefits that can be assigned to each group of workers is calculated. The hourly compensation for each worker is her reported hourly wage plus hourly nonwage benefits for her job category.
Raw full-time and nonprofit differentials are presented in Table 1 . We ran linear regressions of the logarithm of wages and compensation on state dummies and a full-time dummy, separately for nonprofit and for-profit centers, to obtain the information displayed in the top half of the table. The logarithms of wages and compensation are run on state dummies and a for-profit dummy separately for full-time and part-time workers to obtain the information displayed in the bottom half of the table. The values in parentheses are percentage differences. According to Table 1 , controlling for state differences, full-time wages are not different from part-time wages in nonprofit centers, but full-time compensation is greater than part-time compensation. In for-profit centers both wages and compensation are greater for fulltime workers. The bottom half of the table demonstrates that there exist nonprofit markups in both wages and compensation. Table 2 presents worker characteristics by type of worker. A star indicates that the means are statistically different between for-profit and nonprofit centers, or between fulltime and part-time workers, at the 5% level or better. For example, nonprofit workers are older than for-profit workers (35 years of age versus 31 years), and they also have more tenure (45 months versus 30 months). The workers were asked about the main reason for their choice of work in the field of early education and child care. The alternatives given were: it was the highest-paying job at the time; it is a desirable job (pleasant job environment); low cost of working; flexible working hours; this is an important job that someone needs to do. If the worker chose the last alternative, then the dummy variable Important job takes the value of one; it is zero otherwise. This variable is a direct indicator of the intrinsic value to the individual of working in the child care sector. As such, it allows for a direct test of the labor-donation hypothesis; that is, all else the same, individuals with this attitude are expected to command lower wages, especially in the nonprofit sector. Table 3 displays the descriptive statistics of center characteristics. Publicly regulated is 1 if the center receives public money, either from the state or federal government, tied to higher standards (above and beyond normal licensing regulations), and 0 otherwise. This group includes Head Start programs, centers where 20% or more of the enrollment constitutes special-needs children, special preschool programs sponsored by the state or federal department of education, and other special programs in Connecticut and California. 4 The data were compiled with the collaboration of economists, psychologists, and child development experts from University of Colorado at Denver, Yale University, University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill, and UCLA. The details of the data and data collection can be found in . 
THE REVIEW OF ECONOMICS AND STATISTICS
Publicly owned is set to 1 for centers that are owned and operated by public agencies. Examples include public colleges, hospitals, and city departments of family services. Religious is 1 if the center has a religious affiliation (for example, church-based centers), and 0 otherwise. Union is 1 if teachers and/or aides are unionized. There are 18 unionized centers in the sample, and all are nonprofit centers. Of these, 14 are publicly owned centers (Publicly owned), 2 are publicly supported centers (Publicly supported) and 2 are religious centers.
Percent subsidized represents the proportion of children that are subsidized by a government or other agency, such as the state or county department of social or human services, or United Way. Table 3 also displays information about various programs offered by centers, such as evening care, sick care, and before-and after-school care.
Following an extensive literature that investigates the effect of firm size on earnings (Troske, 1999; Main and Reilly, 1992; Brown and Medoff, 1989; Evans and Leighton, 1989) , we include the size of the child care center, measured by full-time equivalent children (FTE children) in the wage and compensation equations. Local unemployment can depress wages through various noncompetitive mechanisms (Blanchflower and Oswald, 1994, chapter 3) . Alternatively, there can be a positive relationship between wages and unemployment, because firms can provide compensating wage differentials to workers in the spirit of the Harris-Todero (1970) and Hall (1970) models. To investigate this effect, we include the unemployment rate in the models. Unemployment is the unemployment rate in the city where the center is located. The ZIP codes of the centers are used to determine the city in which the center is located. The unemployment rates for the corresponding cities are obtained from the U.S. Bureau of Labor Statistics, Local Area Unemployment Division. For the cities where BLS figures were unavailable, the unemployment rates are imputed as the average unemployment rates of the neighboring cities within a 20-mile radius.
V. Results
Equations (1)- (6) are estimated jointly with fullinformation maximum likelihood under the error structure displayed by equations (7)-(12). The results are based on five points of support [K ϭ 5 in equation (13)]. The estimated coefficients of the selection equations are not reported here, but are discussed in . 5 Table 4 displays the estimated coefficients of the four wage equations. The dependent variables are the logarithms of wages. We observe that female part-time workers earn 11% and 4% less, respectively, in the for-profit and nonprofit sectors, than their male counterparts. Race is also a determinant of wages: blacks and Hispanics receive positive premia, and white and Asian part-time workers in the nonprofit sector command lower wages. Table 5 presents the results of a series of hypothesis tests pertaining to the equality of the coefficients of human .627, which indicates that the coefficients are different from each other, and the for-profit coefficient is larger. As Table 5 demonstrates, there are differences between for-profit and nonprofit centers regarding the manner in which human capital characteristics affect wages. For fulltime workers, the return to tenure is higher in for-profit centers, but the returns to experience, to a college degree, and to a graduate degree are higher in nonprofit centers. Panel II shows that experience in the child care sector, other experience and a graduate degree are rewarded more heavily in the nonprofit than in the profit sector for part-time workers. Similarly, the lack of special training in child care lowers wages of part-time workers more in the nonprofit 6 The hypothesis tests utilize the information reported in Table 4 along with the variance-covariance matrix of the estimated coefficients. 7 The exception is the test pertaining to the coefficients of Special training. Because these coefficients are always negative, a positive tstatistic indicates that the first coefficient is smaller than the second one in absolute value. sector. On the other hand, a community college degree has a higher return in the for-profit sector. With the exception of Other experience in panel III and Experience in panel IV, all significant t-values have negative signs in panels III and IV of Table 5 . This demonstrates that part-time coefficients are larger in magnitude than full-time coefficients in both forprofit (panel III) and nonprofit centers (panel IV), and indicates that the return to education is higher for part-time than for full-time workers in both sectors.
To the extent that the variable Important job is capturing the attitudes toward labor donation of nonprofit workers, its coefficient should be negative in the nonprofit wage equation. Table 4 shows that the coefficient of Important job is negative for both full-time and part-time workers in the nonprofit sector, with a bigger magnitude for full-time workers. It is positive in the for-profit sector, although statistically significant only for full-time for-profit workers. This is an interesting result, which provides support to the labor-donation hypothesis for nonprofit workers. It also suggests that this particular attitude may be correlated with productivity, which is rewarded in the for-profit sector. 8 Center characteristics have significant effects on wages. For example, wages in on-site centers are substantially higher for both full-time and part-time workers in both sectors. For-profit centers which are part of a national chain offer wages to full-timers and part-timers that are 6% and 12% lower, respectively, than in nonchain for-profit centers. Wages are 3%-4% lower in religious centers.
There is a substantial union wage premia in nonprofit centers. Unionized nonprofit centers provide a 22% wage premium to both full-time and part-time workers. The union variable in the analysis indicates whether or not the center is unionized. The effect of this union variable on part-time wages has two possible explanations. The first is that parttime workers are also covered by the union. The second is that part-time workers are not covered by the union, but there is a spillover effect. 9 Local unemployment has a negative effect on part-time nonprofit workers' wages. Larger for-profit centers pay a wage premium to both full-time and part-time workers, which is consistent with the literature on size differentials (Troske, 1999) . On the other hand, there is a negative relationship between center size and wages in the nonprofit sector. In Table 6 we present the estimated coefficient compensation equations. 10 The results are similar to the ones obtained from wage regressions.
To understand the extent to which the observed wage and compensation differences are attributable to observable characteristics, we estimated wage and compensation equations identical to those reported in Tables 4 and 6 using OLS. These OLS regressions attempt to explain the variation in wages and compensation within sectors without regard to selection. The results, which are reported in rows (2) of Table 7, demonstrate that, for the most part, controlling for human capital and firm characteristics reduces the size of the observed wage and compensation gaps.
Our estimated model [equations (1)- (13)] enables us to investigate what a randomly chosen individual's wage and compensation would be under the four possible regimes (full-time, for-profit; full-time, nonprofit; part-time, forprofit; and part-time, nonprofit). Using the estimated parameters of the system and the estimated heterogeneity coefficients, we simulated the potential wages and compensation for all workers in the sample under the four possible 8 A more detailed discussion of the results on personal characteristics can be found in . 9 We attempted to contact the unionized centers in the data set to ask whether part-time workers were also covered by the union in 1993. We could not reach four out of the twelve centers, either because they were not in operation any longer, or their phone numbers had changed. Four of the remaining eight centers indicated that part-time workers were also covered by the union. One center indicated that part-timers were not covered by the union, and three centers could not answer the question. So the channel through which the union affects part-time wages remains unclear. 10 The results of the selection equations are reported in . They can also be obtained from www.econ.cudenver.edu or www.gsu.edu/ϳecoext. Pr stands for for-profit, Np for nonprofit, Ft for full-time, Pt for part-time. a Because the coefficient of special training is negative in all wage equations, a negative value for the t-statistic indicates that the first coefficient is greater than the second one in absolute value.
regimes. That is, we calculated selection-corrected and heterogeneity-adjusted wages and compensation that each worker would earn if assigned to a particular regime. The prediction errors of wages and compensation are also calculated for each worker under each regime. This allows for the calculation of the standard errors of the means of predicted wage and compensation. Calculation of the 95% confidence intervals around the means indicate that we can reject the hypotheses of the equality of wages and compensation-with the exception of full-time and part-time wages in the for-profit sector, whose confidence intervals overlap. 11 Rows (3) of Table 7 present the direction and the magnitudes of these markups. After controlling for selection effects and unobserved worker heterogeneity, full-time wages are 12.5% lower than part-time wages in nonprofit centers, and they are equal to part-time wages in for-profit centers. This is not a common result in the literature, but it is not without precedent. Blank (1990) also found that selection-adjusted wages of part-time workers were higher than those of comparable full-time workers. She was unable 11 Var(¥ i /n) ϭ (1/n 2 )¥ Var( i ), where i stands for the predicted wage or compensation, Var( i ) ϭ 2 ϩ X(XЈX) Ϫ1 XЈ 2 , and 2 is the variance of the errors. The estimated standard errors for wage equations in pr-ft, np-ft, pr-pt, and np-pt are 0.0045, 0.0054, 0.0030, and 0.0009, respectively. They are 0.0024, 0.0019, 0.0013, and 0.0017 for compensation equations. to do her analysis using compensation because of lack of data. In nonprofit centers, the compensation markup is also in favor of part-timers, and larger than the wage markup in magnitude (24.9%). This indicates that not only are parttime workers' wages higher than full-time workers' wages in nonprofit centers, but part-time workers receive more benefits per hour worked than full-time workers. Although part-time workers' wages are equivalent to full-time workers' wages in for-profit centers, the average compensation of part-time workers is 23% higher than that of full-time workers, indicating that, similarly to the pattern in nonprofit centers, for-profit centers provide more benefits to part-time workers. These results are in sharp contrast to the raw data displayed in Table 1 , which are also displayed in rows (1) of Table 7 .
Row (3) of the bottom panel of Table 7 demonstrates that full-time workers' wages are 5.8% higher in the nonprofit sector than what they would have earned in the for-profit sector. The nonprofit full-time markup in compensation is 7.8%. Part-time workers' wages and compensation are higher in the nonprofit sector than in the for-profit sector. However, the markup in compensation is smaller, suggesting that for-profit centers provide better benefits than nonprofit centers to part-time workers.
We also calculated selectivity-corrected markups, assuming no individual heterogeneity, which are reported in rows (4). The markups are somewhat larger in absolute value for part-time workers' wages, and smaller in the case of nonprofit differentials.
These results indicate that part-time jobs are good jobs in child care. The observed wage differences between full-time and part-time workers is not explained by differences in workers' human capital or by differences in firms' characteristics. The fact that the raw wage differences are in favor of full-time workers implies that, as suggested by Blank (1990) , part-time workers may have earned lower wages even when they worked full time, due to additional unobserved worker attributes. For example, it is plausible that less productive or less ambitious workers, or workers who are not prepared to spend much job effort, are self-selected into part-time jobs. The results also support the propertyrights hypothesis in that we uncover significant nonprofit wage and compensation differentials.
VI. Sensitivity Analysis and Representativeness of the Data
Our analysis included detailed worker and firm attributes. Examples are Organization and Important job for workers, and Percent subsidized, Center age, Partweek, Extended care, Head Start, Before and after school, Summer camp, Evening care, Sick care , and 24-hour care for firms. To investigate the importance of controlling for these worker and firm characteristics, we omitted these variables from the system and reestimated the models. Omission of these variables implies 44 restrictions on the unrestricted models. The calculated likelihood ratio was 614.46 for the wage model and 652.6 for compensation, strongly rejecting the hypothesis that these worker and firm attributes are unimportant. Furthermore, with the omission of these variables both wage and compensation models provided different results regard- W stands for wage, C for compensation, ft for full-time, pt for part-time, np for nonprofit, and pr for for-profit. Percentage differences are reported in parentheses and calculated as exp{X ft Ϫ X pt } Ϫ 1 or exp(X np Ϫ X fp } Ϫ 1, where X is the average wage or compensation for the relevant regime. Thus, the negative values for full-time differentials indicate that full-time wages and compensation are smaller than the corresponding part-time values.
ing the markups from the ones reported in Table 7 . More specifically, the nonprofit wage markup for full-time workers became Ϫ5.1% (as opposed to the ϩ5.8% reported in Table 7 ). Similarly, the nonprofit compensation differential for full-time workers, reported as 7.8% in Table 7 , is estimated as Ϫ2.1% in the restricted model.
In addition to the omitted variables mentioned above, we further reduced the models by omitting the following firm characteristics: On-site, National chain, Publicly supported, Publicly owned, Publicly regulated, and Religious. In other words, we made our models similar to those in other papers in the literature which included information on nonprofit status of the firm, but did not have additional information about the details of the ownership. These additional omitted variables generate 16 further restrictions. We found that these additional restrictions hurt the models even further. The calculated likelihood ratio was 235.4 for the wage system (the 1% critical value is 32 for 16 degrees of freedom), and 48.4 for the compensation system. The nonprofit wage differential for full-time workers was Ϫ4.7%, and the full-time markup in the for-profit sector was 6.2%. Once again, the results are different from the ones obtained from the original models. This exercise underscores the importance of detailed worker and firm characteristics, and highlights the incorrect inferences that can be made in their absence.
To investigate the sensitivity of the results to variations in empirical strategy, we performed two exercises. First, we estimated the models with different number of support points. The results reported in Tables 4 and 6 are based on 5 points of support of the unobserved common factors (v) in equation (13). We estimated both wage and compensation equations with five and four, with four and five, with four and four, and with six and six points of support. The estimated coefficients were unaffected. Furthermore, the calculated wage and compensation markups were very similar to those reported in Table 7 (based on five points of support). 12 Second, we investigated the sensitivity of the results to the method of modeling selection. As an alternative to the discrete factor method, we used a double-selection procedure (see for example Main and Reilly, 1992; Krishnan, 1990) . In this procedure, the two selection equations are estimated using bivariate probits, which provide estimates for selection into full-time and for-profit. These selection terms for each individual are entered into the four wage (or compensation) equations as additional regressors. Selectionadjusted predicted wage and compensations are calculated for each individual, and their averages are reported in Table  7 in rows (5). The results obtained from this two-step procedure are consistent with those obtained from fullinformation maximum likelihood, although the markups obtained from the double-selection method are somewhat larger in absolute value.
Can these results be attributable to some anomaly of the child care industry? To entertain this question, we used the 5% Public-Use Micro-Sample (PUMS) of the 1990 Census. We extracted all workers with positive wages and salary income who worked in hospitals, nursing and personal care facilities, elementary and secondary schools, colleges and universities, educational services, bus service and urban transit, and research, development, and testing services. These industries have bigger nonprofit presence than the others. To investigate the raw nonprofit and full-time wage differentials in these industries we ran regressions of the logarithm of wages on nonprofit and full-time dummies as well as state dummies. The results are reported in Table 8 . The nonprofit wage premium is positive in all cases, although not significant in educational services. The raw full-time wage markup is zero in hospitals and negative in nursing and personal care, but positive everywhere else. Thus, the descriptive information from the 1990 census shows that the raw nonprofit and full-time markups of the child care industry are similar to those observed in many other industries with a significant nonprofit presence, indicating that our results are not likely to be driven by some idiosyncratic structure of the child care industry.
VII. Conclusion
This paper uses a rich employer-employee matched data set to investigate the existence and the extent of nonprofit and part-time wage and compensation differentials. Utilizing data exclusively on child care workers, we avoid potential contamination of results due to interindustry 12 Increasing the numbers of points of support beyond six and six imposes a computational burden and leads to instability of the system. The dependent variable is the logarithm of wages, which is calculated as the ratio of wage or salary income to the product of usual hours worked per week and weeks worked. The entries are the coefficients of the nonprofit and full-time dummies. Robust standard errors are in parentheses. The regressions also include state dummies.
unobservables. The raw data reveal wage and compensation premia in favor of nonprofit workers. They also reveal the existence of wage and compensation premia in favor of full-time workers in for-profit centers, and compensation premia in favor of full-time workers in nonprofit centers. An analysis of the 1990 Census data shows that these raw differentials are similar to those found in many industries with significant nonprofit sector presence.
The empirical strategy adjusts for workers' self-selection into the for-profit or the nonprofit sector, as well as into full-time or part-time work. We also control for unobserved worker heterogeneity using a discrete factor model. The wage and compensation equations are estimated jointly with the selection equations using full-information maximum likelihood.
We find differences between the regimes (full-time forprofit, full-time nonprofit, part-time for-profit, part-time nonprofit) in the way in which human capital of the workers are rewarded. For example, in both for-profit and nonprofit sectors, the return to education is higher for part-time workers. For full-time workers, the return to tenure is higher in for-profit centers. In nonprofit centers, the return to experience in child care for full-time workers is higher than that of part-time workers, and in for-profit centers the return to experience outside child care is higher for full-time workers.
There is substantial variation in wages as a function of employee characteristics, and there is variation in wages within sectors. For example, unionization increases wages and compensation 20%-25%, and centers that are part of a national chain provide lower wages and compensation. Other examples are the job title of the worker and the age group of the children he/she is serving. Similarly, center characteristics-such as the age and the size of the center; whether the center is publicly supported, publicly owned, or regulated; and whether it is a religious center-affect wages and compensation. Along the same lines, various programs offered by the centers (e.g. sick care, evening care) have significant effects.
After estimating the models, we calculate the wage and compensation that each worker in our sample would have received under each regime after controlling for nonrandom selection and unobserved worker heterogeneity. We find that the potential wages of part-time workers are equivalent to those of full-time workers in the for-profit sector, and they are higher in the nonprofit sector. Part-time workers' compensation is higher than that of full-timers in both sectors, and the compensation markup is larger than the wage markup. This suggests that part-time workers receive more benefits in both sectors. We find evidence of positive nonprofit wage differentials for both full-time and part-time workers. Compensation is also higher in the nonprofit sector for both types of workers.
The magnitudes of these differentials are substantial. For example, the nonprofit wage differential is almost 6% for full-time workers and 20% for part-time workers. The nonprofit compensation differential is 8% for full-time workers and 10% for part-time workers. Similarly, part-time workers earn wages that are 13% more than those of full-time workers in nonprofit centers. Part-time compensation is 25% more than full-time compensation in nonprofit centers, and 23% more in for-profit centers.
The same basic results are obtained when selection is modeled using a two-step procedure. These results underscore important points. First, it seems critical to control for the effect of worker self-selection into sector and into full-time work. Second, it is important to have detailed controls for both employer and employee characteristics, as they have significant effects.
The results indicate that part-time jobs are good jobs in center-based child care, and they show the existence of nonprofit wage and compensation premia, which supports the property-rights hypothesis.
